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INTRODUCTION

In the two decades since the first federal court' recognized
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title
1.
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D. D.C. 1976). Williams involved the termination
of a female employee because she refused to accede to her supervisor's sexual advances. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired "not because she was a woman, but rather because
she decided not to furnish the sexual consideration ... demanded." Id. at 657. The court
rejected this argument and stated that "the conduct of the plaintiffs supervisor created an
artificial barrier to employment which was placed before one gender and not the other." Id.
Rather than read Title VII narrowly to prohibit only sex-based stereotypes, the Williams court
recognized that Title VII prohibited all discrimination on the basis of sex, including sexual
harassment.
Other courts held that sexual harassment did not amount to discrimination based on sex.
See, for example, Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975); Ludington v.
Sambo's Restaurants,474 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Wis. 1979). These courts reasoned that the sexual
harassment at issue was not actionable under Title VII because it did not involve a policy of the
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VII,2 sexual harassment has become an oft-discussed and increasingly
litigated issue. The cause of action for sexual harassment arose as a
result of the feminist revolution that brought women3 into the workforce in unprecedented numbers. Women began to hold positions
previously occupied by men and to demand equal treatment, respect,
and dignity.4 Some believe that women have already achieved equality in the workplace. 5 The issue of sexual harassment, however, continues to spawn much debate as the role of women in society and,
consequently, workplace norms continue to evolve.6 This Special
Project addresses four current issues in sexual harassment law.
employer. Rather, the conduct was "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity[,] ...
mannerism[, or] . . . personal urge." Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163. These courts feared that
recognition of a cause of action for sexual harassment would lead to "a potential federal lawsuit
every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another." Id.
2.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 and Supp. 1993). Title VII prohibits employer
discrimination against an individual with regard to the individual's "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1). Although Title VII does not expressly prohibit sexual
harassment, the United States Supreme Court has held that such conduct is discrimination on
the basis of sex with respect to the terms, conditions, and privileges of an individual's
employment and thus violates Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986).
3.
Admittedly, men can and have been victims of sexual harassment. See Alba Conte, 1
Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace § 1.1 at 1 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 1994) (citing a survey
However, the
finding 15% of male employees surveyed reported sexual harassment).
development of the law surrounding sexual harassment is inextricably tied to the women's
movement and the efforts of women to achieve equal rights. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual
Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. 35, 40-42 (1990)
(discussing women's collective consciousness raising in the 1960s and 1970s and the emergence
of sexual harassment litigation). See also, Conte, 1 Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace at iii
(dedicating the treatise to "all the women who decided that enough was enough").
See Thomas I. Emerson, Foreword,in Catherine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of
4.
Working Women vii, vii (Yale U., 1979). Professor Emerson noted in 1979: "As women's
liberation makes progress, the facts [about sexual harassment] are beginning to come into the
open and the profound implications for our society are beginning to be understood." Id.
That the cause of action for sexual harassment did not arise until the mid-1970s is not to
say that workplaces were free from sexual harassment prior to then. Indeed, sexually harassing
conduct, though largely undocumented, has been around as long as women have been in the
workforce. However, the sexual revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s brought enormous
change to society and workplace norms. Women no longer believed that they had to endure
sexually harassing conduct to earn a paycheck. See Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 40-41.
The continued controversy over sexual harassment is, in part, a result of the debate over these
changing norms. See note 6.
5.
See Linda Chavez, Many Women Don't Want to Break Glass Ceiling, The (Nashville)
Tennessean 15A (March 23, 1995). Ms. Chavez states: "Don't call [women] victims. We've set
different priorities and experienced different rewards." Id. See also Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discriminationand the Transformation of Gender Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1184 (1989)
(commenting on a student's remark that "[w]omen have gotten just about everything they
wanted... [and that] the time for militancy is over").
Compare Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1202-03 (stating that Title VII and the cause of
6.
action for sexual harassment presents an opportunity to correct the imbalance created by a
male-centric workplace and encouraging courts to focus on the harm of sexual harassment from
a woman's perspective) with Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigmfor Sexual Harassment: Toward the
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Although studies in the mid-1970s revealed the pervasiveness
of sexual harassment of working women,7 and the Supreme Court
recognized the cause of action in 1986,8 sexual harassment did not
receive substantial public attention until Justice Clarence Thomas'
confirmation hearings in October 1991. 9 Since then, other allegations
of sexual harassment have kept national attention on the issue.1
Media attention, in part, spurred Congress to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,11 which contains provisions allowing both compensatory and punitive damages to victims of intentional sexual harassment.12 In addition, the Federal Judicial Conference, fearing abuse of
the unwelcomeness standard by sexual harassment defendants, extended Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the federal rape-shield rule, to
civil cases.'3 These recent statutory and rule changes make it more
attractive for victims to bring sexual harassment claims by making
available greater rewards and reducing the likelihood of further
harassment during the litigation process.

4

Optimal Level of Loss, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 427, 475 (1994) (asserting that the search for societal
consensus on sexual conduct should consider the attitudes and tastes of both men and women).
7.
See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 821-22 (1991) (citing surveys
consistently finding that 36 to 53% of women questioned identify themselves as victims of
sexual harasssment). See also Conte, 1 Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace § 1.1 at 2-3 (cited
in note 3) (noting similar survey results).
8.
See Meritor,477 U.S. at 73 (holding hostile environment sexual harassment actionable
under Title VII).
9.
See Conte, 1 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace at vi (cited in note 3). The
controversy surrounding Anita Hill's testimony and Justice Thomas' confirmation was so great
that the Southern California Law Review devoted over 300 pages of its March 1992 issue to
essays on the hearings and their societal and legal implications. See 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 12791582 (1992).
10. Scandals bringing national attention to the issue of sexual harassment include the
repeated allegations of sexual harassment against Senator Bob Packwood, the 1991 Navy
Tailhook Convention, and Paula Jones's sexual harassment suit against President Bill Clinton.
11. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
12. Id. at § 102, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1988 and Supp. 1993). Congress, however,
placed caps on these damages so as not to encourage too much litigation or discourage
settlement agreements. Hannah K. Vorwerk, Note, The ForgottenInterest Group: Reforming
Title VII to Address the Concerns of Workers While EliminatingSexual Harassment,48 Vand. L.
Rev. 1019, 1029 (1995). Some commentators have argued that the removal of these caps would
better deter employers from intentionally discriminating while serving to better compensate
victims of such discrimination. See Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 921, 947 (1993).
13. See Fed. Rule Evid. 412 as amended in Amendments to the FederalRules of Evidence,
114 S. Ct. 681, 686-87 (1993). As originally enacted, Rule 412 barred the admisibility of
evidence of a victim's past sexual history in rape cases unless it was constitutionally required.
See generally Paul N. Monnin, Note, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of
Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims after the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1155, 1169-77 (1995) (discussing motivations behind Judicial
Conference amendments to Rule 412).
14. In September 1994, the Wall Street Journal reported the growing trend of defense
attorneys to ask sexual harassment plaintiffs about their past sexual history and the negative
impact this trend has on a plaintiffs willingness to prosecute her suit. See Ellen Schultz and
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The case law surrounding sexual harassment also continues to
develop in ways that reflect the changing nature of society and the
evolving role of women. In particular, the differing judicial treatment
of the two recognized types of sexual harassment, quid pro quo' 5 and
hostile environment,1 underscores the societal tensions inherent in
imposing legal sanctions in sensitive areas of human conduct. Courts
more readily acceptdd quid pro quo harassment because its link to17
tangible terms and conditions of employment was more apparent.
Accordingly, courts uniformly hold employers strictly liable for quid
pro quo sexual harassment.'5 Hostile environment sexual harassment, on the other hand, turns on reasonableness, and is, thus, a
more pliable standard. 19 Courts have been mixed in their receptive20
ness to the doctrine.

Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy, Wall St. J. Al (Sept. 19, 1994). Although the amendments to
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 may reduce some of this questioning during depositions and trials,
some evidence of the plaintiffs past sexual history is still admissible as specific acts evidence
relevant to show invitation to or provocation of the alleged harassment. Monnin, 48 Vand. L.
Rev. at 1210.
15. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a supervisor conditions job benefits (or
threatens job detriment) in exchange for sexual favors. Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers,Inc.,
830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908-09 (11th Cir.
1982).
16. Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when an employee is subject to
unwelcome sexual advances that are severe and pervasive, thus creating an abusive work
environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993). A hostile work
environment can involve harassment by a supervisor, see, for example, id. at 369; a co-worker,
see, for example, Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 873-75 (9th Cir. 1991); or nonemployees, see
Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1107, 1112-16 (1995) (discussing
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) as an early hostile environment
case).
17. Barbara Lindemann and David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassmentin Employment Law 8
(BNA, 1992) (observing that while quid pro quo sexual harassment directly affects a victim's
economic situation as it is based on a "put out or get out" bargain, hostile environment sexual
harassment relies on claims of emotional harm not directly linked to economic detriment or
benefits).
18. See, for example, Henson, 682 F.2d at 909.
19. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (noting that the governing principle is whether a reasonable
person would, under all the circumstances, consider the conduct hostile or abusive).
20. Some courts readily accepted hostile environment claims and have applied the
doctrine broadly. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (broadly
defining the Title VII definition of "employer" to include supervisors who wield "significant
control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing or conditions of employment"); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879
(analyzing hostile environment claims under a "reasonable woman" standard). The Ellison
"Conduct considered harmless by many today may be considered
court remarked:
discriminatory in the future... Fortunately, the reasonableness inquiry which we adopt today
is not static. As the views of reasonable women change, so too does the Title VII standard of
acceptable behavior." Id. at 879 n.12 (citation omitted).
On the other hand, a number of courts continue to view these claims with some skepticism
and attempt to apply the doctrine narrowly. See, for example, Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) overruled by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993) (requiring conduct to cause actual psychological injury before the Sixth Circuit would find
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The skepticism with which some courts view hostile environment claims may be related to underlying concerns about the potential impact of these claims on everyday workplace behavior. This
distrust of hostile environment claims may stem from a fear that
broad application of the doctrine would place too great a burden on
private citizens to change their behavior.21 It may stem from a belief
that the elements of a hostile environment claim are too poorly and
loosely defined to have any clear limit on their meaning.22 Or perhaps
it may simply stem from a belief, by a largely older, male judiciary,
that the putatively hostile behavior is not so egregious to warrant
imposing Title VII liability. 23
In light of the varying levels of receptiveness courts have
shown to hostile environment claims, significant circuit splits have
developed in the adjudication of hostile environment claims. Until
1993, the federal courts of appeal were divided on the level of severity
and pervasiveness required to bring a hostile environment claim.24
The Supreme Court resolved this split in Harrisv. Forklift Systems,
Inc., holding that the challenged conduct need not cause psychological
it sufficiently "severe and pervasive" to warrant a hostile environment claim); Kauffman v.
Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185 (6th Cir. 1992) (construing agency principles narrowly to
avoid employer liability for the hostile environment created by one of its supervisors simply
because the employer fired him); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900-01 (1st
Cir. 1988) (interpreting the Supreme Court's directive to analyze an employer's liability through
agency principles as mere guidance and holding that an employer is liable only if it actually or
constructively knew of the harassment); id. at 898 (stating that unwelcomeness must be judged
from both a male and female perspective and implicitly accepting certain male biases in the
workplace). See also Garciav. ElfAtochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the sexual harassment of a male by another male is not an actionable Title VII
claim); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994) (same).
21. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620-21. Specifically, the Rabidue court believed that "Title
VII was not meant to--nor can-change [the vulgar jokes, rough hewn conversations, or
presence of pornography in the workplace]. It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the
federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers
of America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a
magical transformation in the social mores of American workers." Id. See also Vorwerk, 48
Vand. L. Rev. at 1021 (cited in note 12) (noting that although Title VII created a statute-driven
revolution of gender attitudes in the workplace, these new attitudes are far from obvious to
many male and female workers whose conduct Title VII governs).
22. See Reilly, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 432-33 (cited in note 6) (noting the indeterminacy of the
term "sexual harassment" and asserting that "some commentators use the term to refer
generally and without elaboration to conduct they consider negative"); Cahill, 48 Vand. L. Rev.
at 1123-24 (cited in note 16) (discussing the overbreadth of the "unwelcomeness" element of
hostile work environment harassment).
23. See Monnin, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1190 n.162 and 1190-93 (cited in note 13).
24. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619 (requiring the harassment to be so severe as to affect the
plaintiff's psychological well-being before a claim for hostile environment harassment would lie);
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78 (rejecting the Rabidue approach and stating that "Title VII's
protection of employees from sexual discrimination comes into play long before the point where
victims of sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance").

1014

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1009

injury to be actionable. 25 After Harris,however, many issues regarding hostile environment claims remain open. For example, splits of
authority continue on issues involving employer liability for
harassment by supervisors, 26 the standard of reasonableness for hosof a plaintile environment claims, 27 and the admissibility of evidence
28
trials.
harassment
tiffs past sexual history in sexual
Although much of the case law and the literature regarding
sexual harassment addresses the rights of victims and the liabilities
of employers, courts and commentators have begun to focus their
attention on the employment rights of alleged harassers. Most of the
debate surrounding this issue arises in the union context and
addresses whether arbitrators should affirm an employer's
termination of the alleged harasser as a proper application of the 'just29
cause" termination provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
The prevailing view is that public policy supports the termination of
alleged harassers in virtually all contexts.3 0 In fact, in Stroemann
Bakeries v. Local 776, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

25. 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
26. Compare Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901 and Jones v. Flagship International,793 F.2d 714,
720 (5th Cir. 1986) (both requiring that an employer have actual or constructive knowledge of a
supervisor's harassment before holding the employer liable under Title VI0 with Bouton v.
BMW of North America, 29 F.3d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1994); Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125; and Sparks,
830 F.2d at 1559-60 (all holding that an employer may be liable for the sexual harassment by its
supervisors if they wield control over the victim's hiring, firing, and conditions of employment).
See, generally, Glen A. Staszewski, Note, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in Finding
Employer Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment,48 Vand.
L. Rev. 1057 (discussing these cases and urging courts to apply agency principles strictly and
impute employer liability in most cases).
27. Compare Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (reviewing hostile environment claims under a
"reasonable woman" standard) with Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 (judging reasonableness from both
the male supervisor's and the female employee's point of view). Importantly, the Supreme
Court, in Harris,avoided this issue. 114 S. Ct. at 371 (stating: "We need not answer today all
the potential questions [our holding] raises").
28. Lower courts have struggled with the issue of admissibility of past sexual conduct as
proof of welcomeness and have reached inconsistent standards even within the same circuit.
See, generally, Monnin, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1187-90 and 1206-10 (cited in note 13) (discussing
this issue and surveying cases in the context of amended Federal Rule of Evidence 412).
29. See generally Chris Baker, Comment, Sexual Harassmentvs. LaborArbitration: Does
ReinstatingSexual HarassersViolate Public Policy, 61 Cin. L. Rev. 1361 (1993) (discussing the
competing public policies against sexual harassment and in favor of the finality of the
arbitrator's decision and arguing that courts should defer to arbitrators even when they
reinstate alleged harassers). See also Leslye M. Fraser, Note, Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: Conflicts Employers May Face Between Title VII's Reasonable Woman Standardand
Arbitration Principles,20 N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Soc. Change 1, 45 (1992-93) (urging employers
and unions to amend their collective bargaining agreements to remove the employer's decision
to terminate an alleged harasser from the arbitrator's jurisdiction if the employer proves the
alleged harasser guilty by a preponderance of the evidence).
30. See Young v. Hobart Bros. Co, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 141; Stroemann Bakeries v.
Local 776, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441-42 (3d Cir. 1992).
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reversed an arbitrator's decision to reinstate an alleged harasser
because reinstatement would contradict public policy and would,
therefore, render the arbitrator's decision unenforceable under
contract law.31 Such a broad approach may, however, be antithetical
to the purposes and policies behind the Civil Rights Act because it
would remove the procedural protections collective bargaining
agreements provide alleged harassers and ignore the careful
balancing of interests that Title VII sought to achieve. 32
Much of the debate about sexual harassment can be understood as a conflict between two competing perspectives. The first
views sexual harassment as a group issue and desires a workplace
absolutely free of gender bias and harassment. The second resents
government interference in the workplace and believes that elimination of all gender bias is an impossible or misguided task. Most of the
academic literature on sexual harassment takes the former view on
the belief that sexual harassment results from a societal imbalance
between men and womenm that can be remedied only through concerted social policy.M These commentators frequently urge courts to
adopt rules that facilitate sexual harassment claims. 35 Other com31. Stroemann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1441-42 (noting that "since collective bargaining
agreements are contracts, courts may not enforce them in a manner that is contrary to public
policy[, and]... if an arbitrator construes a collective bargaining agreement in a manner that
violates public policy, an award based on that construction may be vacated by a court").
32. See Vorwerk,48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1034-35 (cited in note 12) (noting that although the
collective bargaining system may provide greater protection to alleged harassers than
employers receive under Title VII, it properly allows alleged harassers an opportunity to present
their case to a neutral forum). Vorwerk urges that alleged harassers in at-will employment
settings should receive similar procedural protections as employees under a collective
bargaining agreement to assure long-term education about workplace norms and to provide
individualized remedies for alleged harassers. Id. at 1054-55.
33. See, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working
Women 1 (Yale U., 1979). Specifically, Professor MacKinnon notes: "Central to the concept [of
sexual harassment] is the use of power derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or
impose deprivations in another. The major dynamic is best expressed as the reciprocal
enforcement of two inequalities. When one is sexual, the other material, the cumulative
sanction is particularly potent. American society legitimizes male sexual dominance of women
and employer's control of workers. . . " Id. See also Conte, 1 Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace § 1.2 at 5-6 (cited in note 3).
34. See, for example, Pollack, 13 Harv. Women's L. J. at 40 (cited in note 3) (recounting
that discussion groups among women led to the realization that sexual harassment was a social
problem and not an individual one); Abrams, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1215-20 (cited in note 5)
(stating that it is unwise to rely on litigation as the only means of workplace reform and urging
the EEOC and employers to use broad policies to end workplace sexual harassment).
35. See, for example, Estrich, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 833 (cited in note 7) (arguing for the
elimination of "unwelcomeness" as an element of hostile environment sexual harassment
because it is "fundamentally at odds with all the other elements of the cause of action"); Jolynn
Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law, 42 Duke L. J. 854, 902
(1993) (urging courts to judge sexual harassment claims on a "reasonable victim standard with
an explicit gender analysis"); Staszewski, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1096 (cited in note 26) (urging that
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mentators view sexual harassment as an individual wrong to be
remedied by individuals 6 and believe that sexual harassment law
should serve as a means of properly allocating fault based on economic efficiency 3 7 or assuring that women, as individuals, take responsibility for their own actions and retain their personal autonomy.38 The individual Notes comprising this Special Project reflect
these diverse viewpoints.
The first Note in this Special Project addresses the Title VII
issues raised when an employer terminates an alleged harasser.39
This Note recognizes the perceptual gap between advocates of new
gender workplace norms who have met with success in amending
Title VII and in litigating Title VII claims and those individuals
whose conduct Title VII governs. In light of this gap, this Note discusses the procedural protections that Title VII provides to employers
accused of sexual harassment and observes that Title VII gives an
employer the opportunity to settle the claim or to litigate it in a neutral forum before incurring any penalty. Employees who work for the
government or under a collective bargaining agreement receive similar procedural protections in that they may refute the charges against
them in a neutral forum to determine the appropriate penalty, if any.
In contrast, employees in at-will situations receive no procedural
protection. In fact, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") guidelines insulate an employer from liability if the
employer takes immediate corective action, and thus encourage
immediate termination of the alleged haraser. This Note argues that
courts apply agency principles broadly to hold employers liable for harassment committed by
their supervisors); Monnin, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1194-95 (cited in note 13) (approving of the
extension of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 to sexual harassment claims to encourage women to
bring claims).
36. See Reilly, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 434 (cited in note 6). Professor Reilly opines:
"Characterizing sexual conduct based on the tastes and preferences of an individual who
experiences that conduct presupposes that an individual's reaction to conduct (positive or
negative) accurately reflects the value or cost of that conduct to her. She is presumptively the
best judge of whether and to what extent the challenged conduct harmed or benefitted her." Id.
37. Id. at 450 (asserting that "[c]onsideration of economic efficiency can and should guide
the courts in deciding sexual harassment cases").
38. See Cahill, 48 Vand. L. Rev. at 1145 (cited in note 16) (noting that "for the sexes to be
equal, it is essential for women to be viewed as responsible actors" and supporting a limited
assumption of risk defense to nonemployee hostile work environment claims because such a
defense would hold women responsible for their voluntary choice to work in environments
promoting sex appeal). See also Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 6
(1994) (noting that the law should view women as rational thinkers and criticizing the battered
women's syndrome defense as resting on a belief that women are incapable of exercising selfcontrol).
39. See Hannah K. Vorwerk, Note, The ForgottenInterest Group: Reforming Title WI to
Address the Concerns of Workers While EliminatingSexual Harassment,48 Vand. L. Rev. 1019
(1995).
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at-will employees should receive similar procedural protections as employers under Title VII to further Title VII's goals of conciliation and
long-term attitudinal change.
The second Note addresses the issue of employer liability for
hostile work environment harassment committed by an employer's
supervisors. 40 In MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court
suggested that lower courts look to agency principles when determining whether to hold an employer liable for sexual harassment committed by its supervisors. 41 This Note analyzes subsequent lower court
decisions and observes that many courts do not apply agency principles faithfully. Rather, these lower courts hold employers liable only
if they were negligent or if the docrine of respondeat superior applies.
In contrast, full application of Section 219 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency would also give rise to employer liability when a
harassing supervisor exercises apparent authority over a harassed
employee or was aided by the agency relationship. Application of an
apparent authority standard would result in employer liability in
most, but not all situations. The second Note urges courts to embrace
this standard as a matter of sound public policy in light of Title VII's
broad remedial scheme.
Following this discussion of employer liability, the third Note
asks whether there should be an assumption of risk defense to some
types of sexual harassment claims.42 Focusing on the lawsuit filed by
several former waitresses against the restaurant Hooters, this Note
discusses hostile work environment sexual harassment by co-workers
and by nonemployees and uses the tort concept of assumption of risk
to review the claims made by the former waitresses. This Note argues that a limited assumption of risk defense would be useful in
reviewing claims of hostile environment sexual harassment by
nonemployees when the employee knowingly chose to work in a sexually charged environment. Such a limited defense would recognize
that women can and do make voluntary choices about where they
work and should be able to market their sexuality at a premium wage
if they so desire.
Finally, the fourth Note discusses issues relating to the recent
extension of the federal rape shield evidence rule to civil cases and the

40. Glen A. Staszewski, Note, Using Agency Principlesfor Guidance in FindingEmployer
Liability For a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment,48 Vand. L. Rev.
1057 (1995).
41. 477 U.S. at 72.
42. Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to
Some Hostile Work Environment Claims?,48 Vand. L. Rev. 1107 (1995).
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anticipated impact that this evidentiary rule change will have on
sexual harassment claims.4 3 Sexual harassment claims ultimately
rely on whether the sexual conduct at issue was "unwelcome." In an
effort to show at trial that the conduct at issue was not unwelcome,
defendants have increasingly turned to evidence of the plaintiffs past
sexual history. Such evidence puts the plaintiff in an uneasy position
of seeking to remedy a wrong while potentially subjecting her private
life to public scrutiny. Abuse of this type of evidence in rape cases led
to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 412, the federal
rape-shield rule, and the Federal Judicial Conference extended this
rule to civil cases in 1994. The final Note examines this extension of
Rule 412 and analyzes the standard of admissibility of the plaintiffs
past sexual history in light of the new evidentiary rule. The Note concludes that courts are bound by the language of the rule and
consistent case law to admit only "specific acts" evidence of a
plaintiffs prior sexual history proven to be known to the defendant.
Sexual harassment claims, particularly those involving hostile
environments, are likely to be the means by which the struggle to
alter workplace gender norms is achieved. Society presently lacks a
consensus, however, as to what behavior constitutes sexual
harassment, despite growing public awareness of the issue and
increased penalties for sexually harassing conduct. As the stakes in
sexual harassment suits increase, so will debate on the issues that
these claims raise. The Notes in this Special Project provide insight
into this growing debate as the authors analyze the state of sexual
harassment law and offer recommendations on the directions in which
the law should evolve.
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